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Constitutional Law-Civil

Rights-REPRESENTATIVE PARTY NEED ONLY
SHOW SUFFICIENT NEXUS WITH CLASS FOR TITLE VII CAss ACTION TO

CONTINE-Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975).
For many years the brunt of racial discrimination was sorely felt in the
area of employment. Today, however, an employee or job applicant who
desires to redress an alleged racially discriminatory employment practice
has two statutory remedies: 42 U.S.C. § 1981,1 and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.2 Under section 1981, all citizens "have the same right
. . . to make and enforce contracts," which necessarily includes the right
to contract for employment. It has been established that an action under
this section may be brought alleging racial discrimination in employment
without demonstrating state action. 3 Title VII was enacted to reinforce
section 1981,1 eliminate historical patterns of discrimination in employment and provide broad relief for victims of that discrimination.' To
achieve these goals, Title VII forbids an employer in his employment practices from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.6 An individual who alleges a violation of Title VII has two
available remedies: filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,7 or bringing a private action in a federal district court.8
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
This section was derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Enforcement Act of 1870.
2. 42 U.S.C. 99 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. I, 1972). For an analysis of the 1964 legislation see 78 HARv. L. REv. 684 (1965). For
an analysis of the 1972 legislation see Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972).
3. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 n.78 (1968); Sanders v. Dobbs
Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1098 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
For background on the state action debate see Note, Section 1981 and PrivateDiscrimination: An HistoricalJustificationFor a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1024, 1031-33
(1972).
4. Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 948 (1971); 110 CONG. REC. 13650-52 (1964).
5. For a discussion of the congressional intent and legislative history of Title VII see Vaas,
Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 431 (1966); BNA, THE CML RIGHTS
AcT OF 1964 (1964); EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TrrLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
AcT OF 1964, at 10-11 (1964).
6. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1974).
7. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
8. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
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In 1966, the procedural basis securing a Title VII claimant's access to a
federal district court was developed? Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure'0 was amended "to make it clear that civil rights suits for injunctive or declaratory relief can be brought as class actions."" The draftsmen
specifically designed subsection (b)(2) of Rule 2312 to be used in civil rights
class action suits where the class is too broad and diverse to allow precise
definition. Definitive guidelines were developed under Rule 23(a)" regarding the essential characteristics of both the class and its representative. 5
Problems arose as courts attempted to reconcile the broad Title VII
remedies with the specific prerequisites of Rule 23(a).1I The central issue
has been whether the representative party of a class action may continue
to represent the original, broad class once his individual claim has been
dismissed, or whether the class must be substantially narrowed to conform
9. See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.02-1 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
See also Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
thc Federal Rules of Civil Procedure(1), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 386 (1967).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
11. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1776, at 35 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. Prior to 1966, some courts held that since there was
no direct reference to class actions seeking equitable relief (injunction or declaratory judgment), Rule 23 and the class action were unavailable for suits in equity. 7A WRIGHT &MILLER
§ 1775, at 24. See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Morse, The
Scope of Judicial Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 TEXAS L. REV.
516, 515-26 (1968); Note, Class Actions Under Amended Rule 23: Three Years of Judicial
Interpretation,49 B.U.L. REv. 682, 692-700 (1969).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
MOORE].

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole ....
13. Amended Rule 23. See generally Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966); 3B
MOORE
23.40; 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1775; Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection
(b), 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 539, 544 (1969).
14. FED. R. CIv. P. 23:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
15. See 3B MOORE 23.04; 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1759; Note, Class Actions: Defining the
Typical and RepresentativePlaintiff Under Subsections (a)(3) and (4) of FederalRule 23, 53
B.U.L. REV. 406 (1973).
16. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1771.
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to the specific status of the representative party. 7 One view, based on strict
construction of Rule 23(a) (3) and (4), states that the representative must
be a member of the class for the class action to continue. 8 A conflicting
view, traditionally followed by the Fourth Circuit,'" has held that once the
class representative has established his membership in the class, the subsequent dismissal or mootness of his individual claim will not prevent him
from continuing as class representative; nor will it prevent the broad-based
class action from proceeding."0 A third view has been taken by the Fifth
Circuit in an attempt to reach a middle ground in this area of controversy.
It has found that the class representative may continue to represent the
class after his individual claim has been dismissed, provided he can dem17. See generally 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1761; Comment, Continuationand Representation
of Class Actions Following Dismissalof the Class Representative, 1974 DUKE L.J. 573; Comment, ClassActions and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Proper Class Representative and the Class Remedy, 47 TuL. L. REv. 1005, 1006-11 (1973).
18. In Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962), the Supreme Court, although allowing
the class action to continue, stated that plaintiffs "cannot represent a class of whom they
are not a part." See also Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 49 (1969); Spriggs v. Wilson, 467 F.2d
382, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
In Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974), although the class action was again permitted
to continue, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed "the panel's acknowledgement that membership in
the class remains a prerequisite to pursuance of the class action. The words of the Rule permit
no relaxation of this requirement." Id. at 42.
In Norman v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 458 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1972), a class action
was dismissed because the representative's individual claim became moot subsequent to final
adjudication. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said: "Since it is clear that a
named plaintiff cannot bring a suit for a class of which it is not a part. . . we remand the
case to the district court with directions to dismiss the action without prejudice on grounds
of inadequacy of representation.
...
Id. at 499.
It has been argued that "[tihis prerequisite [of class membership] is inherent in the real
party in interest requirement prescribed by Rule 17(a) and is reinforced by the statement in
Rule 23(a) that 'one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
.... ' 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1761, at 584-85 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
But cf. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968). See generally Bledsoe,
Mootness and Standing in ClassActions, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 430, 436-51 (1973).
19. Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d
13 (4th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
1
20. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins, Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975); Roberts v. Union Co., 487
F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1973); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 854 (1973); Rivera v. Freeman, 469 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1972).
It has been suggested that a class action, once certified, assumes an independent judicial
life which is not affected by the subsequent success or failure of the representative's individual claim: "[O]nce the judicial machinery has been set in train, the proceeding takes on a
public character in which remedies are devised to vindicate the policies of the [1964 Civil
Rights] Act, not merely to afford private relief to the employee." Hutchings v. United States
Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 1970).
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onstrate a sufficient nexus between the class and his own interests."'
Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co.22 presented the Fourth Circuit with the opportunity to reevaluate its position regarding this widely disputed point of
law. Plaintiff Barnett, a black man employed by defendant W.T. Grant
Company, 23 sought a promotion from switcher to long-distance truck
driver. After Grant waived its age and experience prerequisites, which
would have immediately disqualified Barnett, he received an unfavorable
rating on his driving test and was refused the promotion. Barnett filed an
individual claim against Grant in a United States district court, under
section 1981 and Title VII, alleging employment discrimination based on
race. He subsequently amended that claim to include a class action under
Rule 23(b) (2) on behalf of all present, past, and potential Grant employees
affected by the alleged discriminatory practices. Those practices included
racial discrimination both in the hiring of over-the-road drivers and in the
selection of supervisors. After a trial on the merits, the district court dismissed Barnett's individual claimu and narrowed the scope of the class he
could represent to only "that group of black persons who have unsuccessfully applied for or requested road driving jobs with the company." Thus
limited to the precise characteristics of Barnett himself, the class no longer
complied with the numerosity requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) and the class
2
action failed.

1

Although the court of appeals agreed that the district court acted within
its proper discretion in disallowing the class action once the scope had been
narrowed, it reversed on the question of narrowing the class which Barnett
could represent.Y Judge Craven, speaking for a unanimous court, noted the
all-inclusive natures of Barnett's claim and reiterated the legislative in21. Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 42 (5th Cir. 1974); Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 714
(5th Cir. 1973).
The nexus theory was enunciated by Judge Godbold in his majority opinion in Huff, in an
attempt to allay his own concerns about the appropriateness of a class representative whose
individual claim had been dismissed. Judge Godbold felt there should be some minimal
aspect of commonality between the class and its representative. Thus, in Huff, the case was
remanded to allow the district court to apply the "nexus" test.
22. 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975).
23. Also included as co-defendants were the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and
its area representative, Local 71.
24. The district court found that, rather than suffering from discrimination, "Barnett may
actually have received preferential treatment." 518 F.2d at 545.
25. Id. at 547.
26. The district court found that the new class consisted of fewer than five persons under
the narrower criteria. Five persons were not considered "so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
27. 518 F.2d at 545.
28. The circuit court gave considerable weight to the fact that Barnett's claim of discrimi-
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tent that Title VII provide sufficient latitude to discern covert discriminatory employment practices. 9 He also stressed that the very purpose for the
enactment of Rule 23(b)(2) was to provide an adequate vehicle for the
resolution of such broad discrimination cases.30 Judge Craven concluded
that the district court, in narrowing the class, did not effectuate the intent
of Title VII and Rule 23(b)(2).
In reversing the restrictions on Barnett's representation, the Fourth
Circuit neglected its own precedent 3' and relied upon Fifth Circuit authority 32 to support its holding. In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. ,'33
the plaintiff, a black employee discharged from his job for allegedly discriminatory reasons, attempted to represent all present and former black
employees who might have been treated similarly by the defendant. The
district court narrowed the class membership before trial to only those
black employees who had been discharged; no attempt was made to determine the facts of the case. The Fifth Circuit reversed the narrowing of the
class, 34 and remanded, saying there must be a trial to determine what, if
any, discrimination Johnson himself had suffered before the class could be
narrowed.3 1 In contrast, a full trial was held by the district court in Barnett, with the determination that not only had Barnett not been discrimi3
nated against, but that he may have received preferential treatment. 1
In Long v. Sapp,37 a black employee, alleging discriminatory employment practices, brought a Title VII class action on behalf of all present and
prospective black employees of the defendant. After a full trial, the district
court narrowed the class because the representative employee had been
lawfully discharged and was therefore no longer similarly situated with the
class she sought to represent. The Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning that
nation was a pervasive attack on Grant's entire operation: "Viewed broadly, Barnett's suit is
an 'across-the-board' attack on all discriminatory actions by defendants on the ground of
race, and when so viewed it fits comfortably within the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2)." Id.
at 547.
See also Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969);
Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1963); Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp.
184, 186 (M.D. Tenn, 1966). Contra, White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 413 (D. Colo.
1971); Hyatt v. United Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 242, 248 (D. Conn. 1970).
29. See note 4 supra.
30. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966); 3B MooRE 23.01 [10-2].
31. See cases cited in note 19 supra.
32. Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
33. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
34. Id. at 1124.
35. Id. at 1125.
36. 518 F.2d at 546.
37. 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974).
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even though the plaintiff had been lawfully discharged, the fact that she
was both black and a former employee established the necessary nexus to
enable her to continue to represent the inclusive class."
In allowing the class action in Bamett to continue, the Fourth Circuit
adopted the "nexus" rationale of Long." Barnett had alleged that Grant's
discriminatory conduct permeated the entire organization. The court of
appeals found that, although Barnett's specific individual claim had been
dismissed, he continued to possess a claim as a member of the class of
present Grant employees. This latter claim formed a sufficient nexus between Barnett and the class to permit him to continue as its representative." The circuit court's finding of actual racial discrimination by Grant
may have influenced its determination that a sufficient nexus existed.
Barnett had presented statistical evidence at trial, demonstrating a significant variance between Grant's black employment percentage and the percentage of blacks in the surrounding community." The court found that
this statistical data established a prima facie case of racial discrimination
and that, contrary to the opinion of the district court, it was unnecessary
for Barnett to prove "specific instances of overt discrimination." 2
38. Id. at 43.
39. 518 F.2d at 548.
40. Id.
41. At the commencement of this suit, the W.T. Grant Company employed blacks only in
the non-supervisory category of warehousemen. These black warehousemen represented 19%
of Grant's total non-supervisory work force. In comparison, blacks accounted for approximately 25% of the adult population in the surrounding community of Charlotte, N.C. In the
category of over-the-road drivers, Grant employed no blacks out of a total of 27 employees.
Id. at 549. Such statistical variances have consistently been held to infer the existence of
racial discrimination. United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 586 & n.7 (4th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970). See Fiss, A Theory of FairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CHi. L. REv.
235, 268-81 (1971); Note, Employment Discrimination:Statisticsand PreferencesUnder Title
VII, 59 VA. L. Rlv. 463 (1973).
42. 518 F.2d at 549. Judge Craven noted other aspects of Grant's employment practices
that strengthened Barnett's statistical challenge. These included word-of-mouth hiring (see
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925 (5th Cir. 1973)), separate hiring
locations for the two Grant divisions (transportation and warehouse), the periodic display of
a sign stating that no applications were being taken, a collective bargaining agreement which
provided no carry-over seniority rights for intracompany transfers (see Gould, Employment
Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How.
L.J. 1 (1967)), and the lack of objective criteria in hiring supervisors (resulting in at least one
qualified black employee being passed over for a promotion in favor of a white employee with
less seniority). This combination of statistical data, employment practices, and subjective
promotion criteria firmly established the validity of Barnett's substantive class action complaint. Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 982 (1972).
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In attempting to structure an appropriate remedy, the court took notice
of Grant's significant voluntary progress toward eliminating racial discrimination since the beginning of the suit.43 The court was concerned, however,
about the class members' available remedies should the suit be dismissed
and Grant later resume its discriminatory practices. The court also did not
wish to have the district court hear the case again: if Barnett was unsuccessful in his representation, the substaritiated claims of the class members would be foreclosed by the doctrine ofres judicata." The case was thus
remanded to the district court, with instructions to monitor Grant's new
non-discrimination policies. Should Grant fail to maintain these policies,
the district court was ordered to immediately enjoin all discriminatory
employment practices. 5 This remedy not only accomplished the aims of
Title VII in an equitable manner, but was also found in Fourth Circuit
precedent."
The Fourth Circuit's application of Rule 23 in Barnett is helpful, and
perhaps necessary, if the congressional intent underlying Title VII is to be
achieved." But conflict continues" over the application of Rule 23 to civil
rights class actions where the representative's individual claim is no longer
valid. In Barnett, the Fourth Circuit adopted the Fifth Circuit's "nexus"
rationale, 9 but made no attempt to reconcile the sharply contradictory
43. 518 F.2d at 550.
44. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125-27 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Godbold, J., concurring); 3B MOORE 1 23.31 [3].
45. 518 F.2d at 550.
46. Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir. 1972).
47. It has been suggested that "the very nature of the claims asserted and the relief
requested in Rule 23(b) (2) suits does suggest that a less stringent application of Rule 23(a) is
appropriate." 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1771, at 663. A more stringent interpretation would
frustrate civil rights litigation seeking to remedy amorphous practices of covert discrimination. If the letter of Rule 23(a) were followed, an employer against whom a Title VII class
action had been filed would need to do no more than satisfy the individual demands of the
class representative in order to have the suit dismissed.
48. There are conflicts even within circuits. Compare Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508
F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975), with Rothblum v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1973).
Compare Roberts v. Union Co., 487 F.2d 387 (6th Cir. 1973), with Heard v. Mueller Co., 464
F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972). Compare Batiste v. Furnco Const. Corp., 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir.
1974), with Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1972).
49. Although the nexus interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) may be essential to preserve effective civil rights litigation, its value in reconciling the conflicting views of the rights of a class
representative is limited. Courts following this theory must search for common elements
which form the nexus between the class and its representative. The nexus found by Judge
Craven in Barnett was tenuous, the only common elements being race and prior contact with
the defendant employer. There appears to be no practical difference between this nexus
theory and the traditional Fourth Circuit view.
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case history. Although writers have offered alternatives,10 the courts appear
content to decide employment discrimination suits on a case-by-case basis,
dispensing justice as appropriate in each specific case, but providing no
definitive guidelines for future reference.
W.A. W. Jr.
50. Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of
the Class Representative, 1974 DuKE L.J. 573, 597-608 (bifurcated trial); Note, The Tentative Settlement Classand Class Action Suits Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 72 MICH.
L. REv. 1462 (1974) (use of tentative settlement classes).

